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Abstract
The literature on public goods has shown that efficient outcomes are impossible if par-
ticipation constraints have to be respected. This paper addresses the question whether
they should be imposed. It asks under what conditions efficiency considerations justify that
individuals are forced to pay for public goods that they do not value. It is shown that par-
ticipation constraints are desirable if public goods are provided by a malevolent Leviathan.
By contrast, with a Pigouvian planner, efficiency can be achieved. Finally, the paper studies
the delegation of public goods provision to a profit-maximizing firm. This also makes par-
ticipation constraints desirable.
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1 Introduction
Should public goods be financed solely out of voluntary contributions or is there a role for
taxes as a source of public goods finance? The disadvantage of a system based on voluntary
contributions is that public goods are underprovided because voluntary contributions tend to
neglect the social benefits of increased public goods provision. By contrast, a system based on
taxes which are raised independently of an individual’s valuation of public goods can provide
sufficient funds for efficient public goods provision. However, if individuals can be forced to pay
for public goods that they do not value, this coercive power may also be abused. If politicians,
bureaucrats or managers can use funds from the public budget to finance projects, their choices
may be biased towards their private interests.
This paper formalizes a tradeoff between the efficiency of public goods provision, on the one
hand, and protection against an abuse of coercive power, on the other. It asks the question
under what circumstances coercion is legitimate in the sense that it makes individuals, by and
large, better off even though occasionally they will be forced to pay for a public good that
they do not value. Broadly speaking, the main result is that if public goods are provided by a
benevolent Pigouvian planner, then individuals are happy to equip this institution with coercive
power. Being benevolent, it will use the instruments at its disposal in the individuals’ best
interests, which implies that public goods are provided efficiently. By contrast, if public goods
are provided by a malevolent planner who seeks to maximize its own payoff at the expense of
individuals, individuals prefer public goods provision based on voluntary contributions.
The result shows that at the heart of the question whether or not the use of coercion is legiti-
mate is a distributive conflict. Both a malevolent Leviathan and a benevolent Pigouvian planner
will provide a surplus-maximizing amount of public goods if coercion is possible. However, the
malevolent Leviathan will keep the entire surplus for himself so that individuals will not benefit
from public goods provision at all. Voluntary public goods finance, by contrast, leaves them at
least a positive share of the surplus, albeit a smaller one.
This paper contributes to the literature on public goods provision under conditions of incomplete
information about public goods preferences. This literature has arrived at two major results.
On the one hand, there is a possibility result : It is possible to reach an efficient allocation of
public goods, even if individuals have private information on their preferences.1 On the other
hand, there is an impossibility result : Efficient outcomes are out of reach if participation con-
straints have to be respected, so that each individual has to be better off relative to a status
1This result is due to d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1979) and Arrow (1979). For a more recent generaliza-
tion, see d’Aspremont et al. (2004).
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quo allocation without public goods provision.2
This literature confronts us with a choice between outcomes that are efficient and second-best
outcomes that avoid the use of coercion. The contribution of the present paper is to answer the
question how this choice should be made; i.e., we clarify under which conditions the objective
to reach efficient outcomes justifies the use of coercion.
Our answer to this question is based on a constitutional choice perspective; that is, we make
the following thought experiment: Suppose there is an ex ante stage at which individuals have
not yet discovered what their preferences are. More specifically, an individual’s objective is to
maximize expected utility, with expectations taken about her future preferences. At this ex
ante stage, individuals decide about the rules according to which public goods are provided.
In particular, they face a choice between a strong and a weak formulation of participation
constraints. The strong formulation requires that, at the interim stage, where individuals have
discovered their preferences, each individual benefits from public goods provision. The weak
version requires only that individuals benefit from public goods provision at the ex ante stage.
To illustrate this by means of an example, think of the construction of a bridge, and suppose
that there are individuals who cross the bridge frequently and others who do so only rarely.
If we impose participation constraints in the weak, ex ante sense, this allows us to force the
non-frequent users to contribute to the financing of the bridge, provided that their utility loss is
compensated for by the utility gain of the frequent users. By contrast, if we impose participation
constraints in the strong, ex interim sense, we lose this opportunity. In this case, the less frequent
users must also be made better off by the construction of the bridge, which implies that they
cannot be forced to pay for a bridge that they hardly ever use.
We say that coercion is legitimate if, at the constitutional stage, individuals opt for partici-
pation constraints in the weak sense.
We approach the question whether coercion and hence efficient public goods provision is le-
gitimate from two different angles.
First, we take a mechanism design perspective. With this approach, we arrive at the con-
clusion that strong participation constraints, which protect individuals from having to pay for
a public good that they do not value, should be imposed if and only if there is a pronounced
agency conflict between individuals and the mechanism designer.3 The logic is as follows: While
strong participation constraints have detrimental consequences from an efficiency perspective,
2See Gu¨th and Hellwig (1986), Rob (1989), Mailath and Postlewaite (1990), Hellwig (2003), or Neeman (2004).
3Hellwig (2003) studies public goods provision by a benevolent mechanism designer who faces participation
constraints in the strong sense. Our result shows that such a mechanism design problem cannot occur if the
relevant constraints are endogenized by means of a constitutional decision at the ex ante stage.
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they also imply that individuals can at least realize an information rent. If the mechanism de-
signer’s objective is to extract the surplus from public goods provision (and hence to minimize
the expected payoff of individuals), then the imposition of strong participation constraints is
desirable because individuals prefer getting an information rent over not getting anything.
Based on this answer, we turn to the more fundamental question where such an agency con-
flict should come from. To motivate this question, suppose for a moment that at the constitu-
tional stage individuals could not only choose between strong and weak participation constraints,
but that they could also specify the mechanism designer’s objective function. Obviously, they
would opt for a benevolent mechanism designer who maximizes the expected payoff of individu-
als. As a consequence, individuals would be happy to remove any constraint from the mechanism
designer’s problem. In particular, they would be willing to accept that they occasionally have
to pay for a public good that they do not value. Hence, the use of coercion would be legitimate
and efficiency could be achieved.
While this reasoning may seem somewhat contrived, it raises the question whether we can
provide a more plausible “microfoundation” for agency conflicts that make strong participation
constraints desirable. In the second part of the paper, we show that there is a positive answer
to this question, and moreover, that giving such a positive answer requires us to leave the
mechanism design framework and to adopt instead an incomplete contracts perspective.
More specifically, the second part of the paper is based on an extended model in which there
are not only individuals with private information about their preferences but also a firm which
produces the public good and has private information about its technology. In this environment,
a mechanism design approach leads to complete contingent planning, i.e., to a specification of
public goods production and individual payments as a function of the individuals’ public goods
preferences and the firm’s technology. Again, we obtain the result that if the mechanism designer
is sufficiently benevolent, then the use of coercion is justified so that efficiency can be reached.
We contrast this with the following incomplete contracts model: There is a regulator who
delegates public goods provision to the firm, i.e., he sells the right to produce the public good
and to collect payments from individuals to the firm. Afterwards, the firm becomes residual
claimant; i.e., the firm communicates with individuals about their preferences and organizes
public goods supply so that its profits are maximized. From the regulator’s perspective, this
arrangement is incomplete in the sense that he remains ignorant with respect to public goods
preferences. His interaction with the firm can at most be contingent on the firms’s technology.
We show that this approach may indeed leave so much discretion to the firm that it is able
to extract the entire surplus from public goods provision. Consequently, individuals prefer the
imposition of strong participation constraints, i.e., in the incomplete contracts model, the use
of coercion is not legitimate.
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To sum up, the analysis shows that, unless there are pronounced conflicts of interests be-
tween the consumers of a public good and the institution which is organizing its supply, coercion
is legitimate and an efficient supply of public goods is possible. By contrast, if there are such
conflicts, strong participation constraints should protect individuals against an abuse of coercive
power. Finally, it is shown that the delegation of public goods provision to a profit-maximizing
firm generates a case in which individuals should be protected: a profit-maximizing firm should
not be given the possibility to charge individuals in excess of their willingness to pay, even if
this comes at the cost of an inefficient public goods supply.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a more detailed
literature review. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 establishes the result that the le-
gitimacy of coercion depends on the mechanism designer’s degree of benevolence. An extended
model in which public goods provision is delegated to a firm with private information about its
technology is analyzed in Section 5. The last section contains concluding remarks.
2 Related Literature
The paper contributes to the literature on public goods provision under the assumption that
individuals have private information on their preferences. For a model with independent private
values, d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1979) and Arrow (1979) have shown that an efficient
allocation of public goods can be implemented as a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. However, this
outcome is out of reach if, in addition, ex interim participation constraints are imposed. This
has been established by Gu¨th and Hellwig (1986) and Mailath and Postlewaite (1990).4 This
impossibility result has led various authors to study second-best problems where public goods
provision is subject to ex interim participation constraints. In particular, Gu¨th and Hellwig
(1986) and Schmitz (1997) study public goods provision by a profit-maximizing monopolist,
and Hellwig (2003) and Norman (2004) study public goods provision by a benevolent utilitarian
planner.
This paper contributes to this literature in various respects. First, it provides an answer to
the question whether, from a normative perspective, strong participation constraints should be
imposed, even if this implies that efficient outcomes cannot be reached. This question has not
been asked before.
Second, the paper makes a technical contribution to the study of second-best problems. Most
of the existing literature assumes that an individual’s public goods preferences are the realiza-
4These papers show that a version of the Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) theorem on the impossibility of
efficient trade holds in an economy with public goods.
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tion of a continuous random variable. This paper, by contrast, works under the assumption
of a discrete number of types (where the number of possible types may be arbitrarily large).
While this has no bearing on the results of the analysis, the model with a discrete set of types
has two major advantages. There is no need to impose differentiability and continuity assump-
tions to make the mechanism design problem tractable. Also, it becomes more explicit which
incentive compatibility constraints are binding and which ones are slack, which leads to a better
understanding of the tradeoffs which shape the optimal mechanism.
Finally, it uses ideas from the literature on incomplete contracts to show that the delegation
of public goods provision to a profit-maximizing firm yields a situation in which the imposition
of strong participation constraints is desirable.5 It thereby bridges two different literatures that
are both relevant for public goods provision, and which are typically treated separately; namely
the literature on the revelation of public goods preferences (which is a major topic in theoreti-
cal public economics) and the literature on the regulation of firms who are in charge of public
production (which is a major topic in industrial organization).6
This work is also related to two recent papers in which participation constraints play a sig-
nificant role.
Gru¨ner (2008) asks the question whether an efficient allocation of public goods can be
achieved with a different set of participation constraints. He requires that each individual is
made better off relative to a situation with majority voting about public goods provision. In
this model, efficient public goods provision is possible. This result is given a positive interpre-
tation; i.e., it explains why despite the impossibility results in the existing literature, public
goods are provided in the real world and why these outcomes may even be efficient: In the real
world the status quo outcome is shaped by democratic institutions. The present paper offers
an alternative positive explanation. Individuals may be willing to accept that, occasionally,
they have to pay for public goods that they do not value if, on average, they benefit from the
provision of public goods. This leads to a weaker notion of participation constraints, so that
efficient outcomes can be achieved.
Acemoglu et al. (2008) compare public and private provision of insurance contracts. They
formalize the following tradeoff: private provision suffers from inefficiencies due to participation
constraints. These problems may be overcome by state provision of insurance, given that the
state has coercive power. The disadvantage of state provision, however, is that the coercive
power may be abused by selfish politicians. The tradeoff “markets versus governments” therefore
5For an overview of the incomplete contracts approach, see Hellwig (1996) and Tirole (1999).
6The seminal article in the latter branch of the literature is Baron and Myerson (1982). For a textbook
treatment and a literature survey, see Laffont and Tirole (1993).
5
becomes a tradeoff between distortions due to participation constraints and distortions due
to agency problems between citizens and politicians. While this tradeoff seems empirically
plausible, the present paper shows that, from a normative perspective, agency problems are
what justifies the imposition of participation constraints. Hence, why should the state be given
coercive power if politicians are not acting in the citizen’s interest? The normative analysis
in this paper suggests that the state should have coercive power only if the agency problems
between citizens and politicians are less significant than the agency problems between private
providers of insurance and their customers.
3 The environment
There is a finite set of individuals, I = {1, . . . , n}. The preferences of individual i are given by
the utility function
ui = θiq − ti,
where q ∈ R+ is the provision level of a public good, ti is individual i’s contribution to the cost
of public good provision and θi is a taste parameter that affects individual i’s valuation of the
public good. For each i, θi belongs to a finite ordered set Θ = {θ
0, θ1, . . . , θm}, with θ0 = 0. We
assume that θl − θl−1 = 1, for all l. We denote a vector of all individual taste parameters by
θ = (θ1, . . . , θn).
From an ex ante perspective, the taste parameters of individuals are independent and iden-
tically distributed random variables that take values in Θ. For any i, we denote the probability
that θi = θ
l by pl. The following notation will prove helpful. For every i, let p(θi) be a random
variable that takes the value pl if θi takes the value θ
l and P (θi) be a random variable that takes
the value
∑l
k=0 p
k if θi takes the value θ
l. Define hl = 1−P (θ
l)
p(θl)
. In the literature this fraction
is known as the hazard rate. We assume that the hazard rate is decreasing, hl < hl−1, for all
l ≥ 1. This assumption is imposed in the following without further mention.
We study public goods provision from an interim perspective, i.e., after individuals have
learned what their preferences are. With an appeal to the Revelation Principle we limit attention
to direct mechanisms and to truthful Bayes-Nash equilibria. A direct mechanism consists of a
provision rule for the public good and, for each individual i, a payment rule. The provision
rule is a function q : Θn → R+ that specifies a public good provision level as a function of the
preferences that individuals communicate to the mechanism designer. Analogously, the payment
rule for individual i is a function ti : Θ
n → R.
A mechanism has to satisfy participation constraints, incentive compatibility constraints and
a budget constraint. The budget constraint requires that expected payments of individuals are
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sufficient to cover the expected cost of public good provision,7
E
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ)
]
≥ E[βk(q(θ))] . (1)
where k is a strictly increasing and strictly convex function with k(0) = 0, limq→0 k
′(q) = 0,
and limq→∞ k
′(q) =∞. β is a parameter that, for the moment, is treated as commonly known.8
The expectations operator E applies to the vector θ of all individual taste parameters.
The incentive compatibility constraints ensure that that truth-telling is a Bayes-Nash equi-
librium: given that all other individuals reveal their taste parameter, the best response of
individual i is to reveal the own taste parameter as well. Formally, for each i, for each θi ∈ Θ,
and for each θˆi ∈ Θ,
θiQi(θi)− Ti(θi) ≥ θiQi(θˆi)− Ti(θˆi), (2)
where
Qi(θˆi) := E[q(θ−i, θˆi) | θˆi]
is the expected level of public goods provision from the perspective of individual i, given that all
other individuals reveal their preferences to the mechanism designer and individual i announces
θˆi. Likewise,
Ti(θˆi) = E[q(θ−i, θˆi) | θˆi]
is i’s expected payment.
A mechanism also has to satisfy participation constraints which ensure that individuals
benefit from the provision of the public good. We distinguish between participation constraints
at the ex interim state or at the ex ante stage. The ex interim participation constraints are as
follows: For all i, and all θi,
θiQi(θi)− Ti(θi) ≥ 0. (3)
These constraints ensure that, after all individuals have discovered what their public goods
preferences are, no individual is worse off relative to a status quo situation in which the public
good is not provided. An alternative interpretation is that individuals are given veto rights that
protect them from having to pay for a public good that they do not value. Consequently, a
deviation from the status quo requires a unanimous agreement to provide the public good.
7It has been shown by d’Aspremont et al. (2004) that to any incentive compatible mechanism that satisfies the
budget constraint in expectation there exists a payoff equivalent incentive compatible mechanism that satisfies
budget balance in an ex post sense, i.e.,
∑n
i=1 ti(θ) ≥ βk(q(θ)), for every θ. Hence, working with budget balance
in expectation is without loss of generality.
8In Section 5 we will assume that the supplier of the public good has private information on β.
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The ex ante participation constraints require that, for all i,
E[θiq(θ)− ti(θ)] ≥ 0 , (4)
so that each individual benefits from public good provision at an ex ante stage, i.e., prior to
learning what the own preferences are. These participation constraints are less restrictive than
those in (3). To make this more explicit we can use the law of iterated expectations to write (4)
as follows: for all i,
m∑
l=0
pl(θlQi(θ
l)− Ti(θ
l)) ≥ 0 .
Consequently, the ex ante participation constraints in (4) require that the ex interim partici-
pation constraints in (3) hold “on average”, but not necessarily for each possible realization of
individual i’s preferences.
These constraints in (4) ensure that the provision of the public good is a Pareto-improvement
if considered behind a “veil of ignorance” where individuals can form an expectation about how
the public good is going to affect their well-being, but are not yet fully informed about their
preferences. These constraints make it possible to rely on coercion when financing the provision
of a public good. Individuals can be forced to pay for a public good that they do not value,
provided that, behind the veil of ignorance, they benefit from public goods provision. The
participation constraints in (3), by contrast, exclude coercion under each and every circumstance.
We can therefore interpret them as providing a maximal protection of economic freedom: No
one may interfere with an individual’s decision to spend his money on the uses that are most
attractive to him.
The analysis focusses on the question whether the use of coercion is beneficial for individuals.
To this end we will compare mechanisms where the ex ante participation constraints have to
be satisfied to mechanisms where the ex interim participation constraints are imposed. The
standard of comparison is the ex ante expected utility of individuals. If this utility is larger
with ex ante participation constraints, then we say that the use of coercion is legitimate in the
sense that if, behind a veil of ignorance, individuals were confronted with a constitutional choice
about the use of coercion, they would unanimously vote in favor of it.
3.1 The tradeoff between efficiency and voluntary participation
We will show in the following that there efficiency is compatible with participation constraints
at the ex ante stage but not with participation constraints at the ex interim stage.
We say that a mechanism (q, t1, . . . , tn) is constrained efficient if it is incentive compatible and
budgetary feasible, and there is no other incentive compatible and budgetary feasible mechanism
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(q′, t′1, . . . , t
′
n), such that for all i, E[θiq
′(θ) − t′i(θ)] ≥ E[θiq(θ) − ti(θ)], with a strict inequality
for some i.9
Proposition 1 A mechanism is constrained efficient if and only if the budget condition (1)
holds as an equality and the public goods provision rule is surplus-maximizing; i.e., for every θ,
q(θ) is chosen so as to maximize (
∑n
i=1 θi) q(θ)− βk(q(θ)).
It is well known that, under conditions of complete information, surplus maximization in con-
junction with budget balance is both necessary and sufficient for Pareto-efficiency if preferences
are quasilinear in money. Proposition 1 shows that the same is true with private information
on public goods preferences, i.e., private information on preferences does not alter the efficiency
conditions.10
The main step in the proof of the Proposition, which can be found in the Appendix, is to show
that to any mechanism that is efficient in the set of allocations that are budgetary feasible (but
not necessarily incentive compatible) there exists a budgetary feasible and incentive compatible
mechanism that leads, for all individuals, to the same level of ex ante expected utility. Intuitively,
incentive compatibility is a condition that affects how expected utility increases ex interim with
an individual’s valuation of the public good.11 However, this is no restriction on the “base
utility”,
θ0Qi(θ
0)− Ti(θ
0) = −Ti(θ
0),
to which these increments are added. Hence, upon manipulating Ti(θ
0) one can generate any
level of E[θiq(θ)− ti(θ)] in an incentive compatible way.
In particular, the if-part of Proposition 1 implies that there exists a constrained efficient
allocation such that the surplus from public goods provision is shared equally among individuals,
i.e., such that the ex ante expected utility of each individual i is equal to
E[θiq(θ)− ti(θ)] =
1
n
E
[
n∑
i=1
θiq
∗(θ)− βk(q∗(θ))
]
> 0 ,
9It should be noted that this definition of efficiency is based on the ex ante expected payoff of individuals.
This efficiency criterion, which implies the desirability of surplus maximization, is predominant in the literature.
However, one could also define an ex interim notion of Pareto efficiency, see Holmstrom and Myerson (1983), and
Ledyard and Palfrey (1999) for an application to public goods provision.
10It has been shown by d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1979) and Arrow (1979) that surplus maximization
can be achieved, given the requirement of incentive compatibility. Proposition 1 is more general. It shows that
surplus maximization is both necessary and sufficient for constrained efficiency.
11 To see that interim utility is increasing note that the incentive compatibility conditions imply that, for each
i, and each l, θlQi(θ
l)− Ti(θ
l) ≥ θlQi(θ
l−1)− Ti(θ
l−1) > θl−1Qi(θ
l−1)− Ti(θ
l−1).
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where q∗ is the surplus-maximizing provision rule. In the following we will refer to this mecha-
nism as the symmetric constrained efficient mechanism.
Obviously, since the expected surplus from public good provision is strictly positive, under
the symmetric constrained efficient mechanism all ex ante participation constraints hold as a
strict inequality. This shows that there is no conflict between efficiency on the one hand and
the imposition of ex ante participation constraints on the other. If the expected benefits from
public goods provision are evenly distributed, then every individual is made better off by public
good provision.12 We summarize these observations in the following Corollary.
Corollary 1 There exists a constrained efficient mechanism that satisfies the ex ante partici-
pation constraints.
By contrast, efficiency may be out of reach with ex interim participation constraints.
Proposition 2 There exists a constrained efficient mechanism that satisfies the interim partic-
ipation constraints if and only if
E
[
n∑
i=1
(
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q∗(θ)
]
≥ E[βk(q∗(θ))] . (5)
The inequality in (5) is violated if the number of individuals is sufficiently large. For a proof
of this claim, see part B of the Appendix. The intuition is that, as the number of individual’s
increases, each single individual’s influence on the public goods provision level becomes smaller
and smaller, so that it becomes more and more attractive to articulate a low taste parameter in
order to mitigate the own contribution to the cost of public good provision. Hence, with more
individuals it is more difficult to raise enough money for efficient public goods provision.13
3.2 Sketch of the Proof of Proposition 2
A formal proof of Proposition 2 can be found in the Appendix. In the following the argument is
sketched. The proof is based on a characterization of revenue maximizing mechanisms, i.e., of
mechanisms that maximize E[
∑n
i=1 ti(θ)], taking the public goods provision rule q as given, and
uses arguments that are familiar from the analysis of optimal non-linear pricing mechanisms.14
12There exist constrained-efficient mechanisms that violate these constraints. Given that utility is perfectly
transferrable between individuals, efficiency can also be achieved if one individual is made very badly-off and
receives a negative expected payoff.
13For a model so that θi is distributed according to an atomless probability distribution, this impossibility result
holds irrespective of the number of individuals, see Hellwig (2003).
14See Mussa and Rosen (1978), Matthews and Moore (1987), or Bolton and Dewatripont (2005).
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In particular, a “relaxed revenue maximization problem” is studied which takes only a subset
of all constraints into account, namely the ex interim participation constraints and the local
downward incentive compatibility constraints,
θlQi(θ
l)− Ti(θ
l) ≥ θlQi(θ
l−1)− Ti(θ
l−1) ,
for all i and l. The observation, that ex interim expected utility is increasing in θi (see footnote
11) then implies that only the participation constraints for types θi = θ
0 need to be taken
explicitly into account. If these are satisfied, then those for higher types are automatically
satisfied as well. A further observation is that the participation constraints for θi = θ
0 and
all downward incentive compatibility constraints have to be binding. Otherwise, taking the
provision rule for the public good as fixed, it would be possible to increase the expected payments
of some types of some individuals without violating any one of the constraints of the relaxed
problem. Given this pattern of binding constraints, it is possible to solve for the expected
payments of individuals as a function of public goods provision rule. This derivation yields
E
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ)
]
= E
[
n∑
i=1
(
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q(θ)
]
.
Consequently, E
[∑n
i=1
(
θi −
1−P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q∗(θ)
]
is an upper bound on the revenues that can be
raised if public goods are provided according to q∗. Constrained efficiency is therefore pos-
sible only if these maximal revenues exceed the expected cost from public good provision,
E[βk(q∗(θ))].
The if-part of the Proposition establishes that this upper bound can actually be reached if
all incentive compatibility constraints; i.e., not only the local downward ones, are taken into
account. By well-known arguments from the analysis of incentive constraints, this is the case if
the public goods provision rule satisfies the following monotonicity constraint: For all i and l,
Qi(θ
l) ≥ Qi(θ
l−1). Obviously, this monotonicity property is satisfied by the surplus-maximizing
provision rule q∗, which is strictly increasing in every individual’s taste parameter.
The expression for maximal revenues is interpreted as follows: Individuals have to be granted
rents because they have private information about their preferences. This implies, in particu-
lar, that a revenue-maximizing mechanism is unable to extract the whole expected surplus
from public goods provision which equals E [
∑n
i=1 θiq(θ)]. As we show in part B of the Ap-
pendix, the expected payoff of individual i under a revenue maximizing mechanism is equal to
E
[
1−P (θi)
p(θi)
q(θ)
]
. An inspection of (5) reveals that the sum of these informational rents reduces
the revenues that can be extracted from individuals.
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3.3 Benevolent Second-best Mechanisms
The observation that ex interim participation constraints may imply that efficiency cannot be
reached has led various authors to study second best mechanisms. Typically, the objective is to
maximize expected utilitarian welfare, E [
∑n
i=1(θiq(θ)− ti(θ))], subject to the budget constraint
(1), the incentive compatibility constraints (2), and the ex interim participation constraints (3).
For brevity, we refer to this problem in the following as the benevolent second best problem.
Proposition 3 If condition (5) holds, then the symmetric constrained efficient mechanism
solves the benevolent second best problem. Otherwise, each individual is, in terms of ex ante
expected utility, strictly worse off.
The Proposition, which is proven in the Appendix, shows that from a normative perspective, the
imposition of ex interim participation constraints is undesirable. These constraints are never
beneficial but sometimes harmful, depending on whether or not the inequality in (5) holds.
Hence, if individuals were given a choice between the imposition of participation constraints at
the ex interim or the ex ante stage they would unanimously opt for the latter. Put differently,
at the ex ante stage, individuals are happy to accept that they occasionally will have to pay for
public goods that they do not value if they are assured that their share of the expected surplus
from public goods provision is sufficiently high. However, these results rely on the assumption
that the mechanism designer is benevolent. In the following section we relax this assumption.
As will become clear, this may give rise to a role for the imposition of participation constraints
at the ex interim stage.
4 Conflicts of interest
In the following, we allow for the possibility that the mechanism designer does not only care
about the expected payoffs of individuals, but also derives utility from resources that he extracts
for himself. In particular, we will formulate a model in which we can vary the mechanism
designer’s degree of benevolence. With this model we will ultimately show that coercion is
legitimate if and only if the mechanism designer is sufficiently benevolent.
Formally, we assume that the public good is provided by a mechanism designer whose ob-
jective is to maximize expected profits,
Π := E
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ)
]
− E[βk(q(θ))] . (6)
However, there is a fraction a fraction τ of profits that are redistributed to individuals in a lump
sum fashion. We treat τ as a given parameter which measures the mechanism designer’s degree of
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benevolence. As will become clear, low values of τ indicate that the mechanism designer extracts
a large fraction of the surplus from public goods provision, whereas a high value of τ indicates
that any surplus extracted will be transferred back to individuals. For ease of exposition, all
individuals are entitled to the same fraction of profits. The per capita share of profits is therefore
equal to τ
n
.
The interaction between the mechanism and the individuals who consume the public good
proceeds as follows. First, prior to the operation of the mechanism, the mechanism designer
makes an unconditional lump sum payment of τ
n
Π∗ to each individual, where Π∗ are the ex-
pected profits that result from the profit-maximization problem. After this payment is made, a
mechanism is chosen in order to maximize Π subject to the incentive compatibility constraints
in (2), and participation constraints. Again, the participation constraints are either imposed at
the ex ante stage as in (4), or at the ex interim stage as in (3).
Remark 1 Imposing a sequential structure where expected profits are distributed prior to the
operation of the mechanism has the following convenient implication: Profits do not enter the
incentive compatibility constraints because the upfront transfer is not conditional on the behavior
of individuals under the mechanism. In part B of the Appendix, we discuss an alternative
version of the model in which profits are not redistributed ex ante (before the operation of the
mechanism), but ex post; that is, after θ has been observed, each individual receives a transfer
τ
n
(
n∑
i=1
ti(θ)− βk(q(θ))
)
.
In part B of the Appendix, it is shown that the above sequential structure can be imposed without
loss of generality: The outcome of the model with a redistribution of profits after the operation
of the mechanism can be replicated by the model with an upfront transfer of expected profits prior
to the operation of the mechanism.
Remark 2 The individuals’ share of expected profits does not enter the participation constraints.
This may be questioned on the following grounds. The participation constraints serve to ensure
that individuals are not worse off as compared to a status quo situation with no public goods
provision. If their share of monopoly profits provides them with utility that they would not be
able to realize in the status quo, then this should be included in the utility that they derive from
public goods provision. Accordingly, the appropriate version of, say, the ex interim participation
constraints would be as follows; for all i, and all θi,
θiQi(θi)− Ti(θi) +
τ
n
Π∗ ≥ 0. (7)
Again, it turns out that the specification with participation constraints as in (7) can be interpreted
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as a special case of the model with the participation constraints that do not include monopoly
profits. This is also clarified in part B of the Appendix.
The following Proposition compares, for an arbitrary individual i, ex ante expected utility with
ex interim participation constraints, V inti , and ex ante participation constraints, V
ant
i . If V
ant
i is
larger than V inti then the use of coercion is legitimate in the sense that the individual in question
is, in an ex ante sense, made better off if coercion is possible.
Proposition 4 Public goods provision is surplus-maximizing with ex ante participation con-
straints and distorted downwards with ex interim participation constraints. Moreover, there
exists τˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that V anti (τ) > V
int
i (τ) if and only if τ > τˆ .
The Proposition shows that the legitimacy of coercion depends on the mechanism designer’s
degree of benevolence. If it is high, then expected payoffs with coercion are close to the sym-
metric constrained efficient mechanism. In this case, the imposition of ex interim participation
constraints is harmful for individuals because it results in a lower level of aggregate surplus.
By contrast, for a low degree of benevolence, individuals prefer the imposition of ex interim
participation constraints, even though this implies that public goods provision is inefficient.
Given that the mechanism designer retains almost the whole surplus, they cannot benefit from
surplus-maximizing public goods provision. The only remaining source of payoffs is therefore
the information rent that individuals can reap provided that ex interim participation constraints
are imposed. Hence, they prefer a larger fraction of a smaller, second-best surplus over a smaller
fraction of the maximal, first best surplus.
This result can be summarized as follows. If public goods are provided in a benevolent
way, the use of coercion is legitimate. A benevolent mechanism designer acts in the interests of
individuals and should hence face as few constraints as possible. By contrast, if a malevolent
institution is in charge of public goods provision then the use of coercion is not legitimate.
A malevolent mechanism designer maximizes its own well-being at the expense of individuals.
Hence, it is in the interest of individuals that he faces as many constraints as possible.
4.1 Sketch of the Proof of Proposition 4
The proof follows from the characterization of the optimal mechanism with ex interim and ex
ante participation constraints, respectively, which we sketch below. A complete proof is in the
Appendix.
Ex interim participation constraints. Consider first the mechanism designer’s problem
with ex interim participation constraints. Once upfront payments to individuals are made, the
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mechanism designer aims at surplus extraction. Whatever his provision rule is, he will therefore
choose the payments of individuals so that expected revenues E [
∑n
i=1 ti(θ)] are maximized.
This problem of revenue maximization, see the discussion following Proposition 2, yields the
following expression for maximal revenues as a function of the public goods provision rule q,
E
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ)
]
= E
[
n∑
i=1
(
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q(θ)
]
.
The mechanism designer therefore chooses the provision rule which maximizes second best prof-
its,
E
[
n∑
i=1
(
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q(θ)− βk(q(θ))
]
.
We denote this provision rule in the following by q∗∗Π . With this second best provision rule,
public goods provision is, for every θ, distorted downwards relative to the surplus-maximizing
level. This follows since q∗∗Π is characterized implicitly by the first order condition,
n∑
i=1
(
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
= βk′(q∗∗Π (θ)) ,
whereas the surplus-maximizing provision level is given by
∑n
i=1 θi = βk
′(q∗(θ)).
The expected payoffs of individuals, from the ex ante perspective are derived as follows:
First, with ex interim participation constraints, they get an information rent which equals
E
[
1−P (θi)
p(θi)
q∗∗Π (θ)
]
; second, they get a fraction τ
n
of the second-best profit. After algebraic ma-
nipulations which make use of the assumption that the individuals’ taste parameters are iid
random variables, we can therefore derive the following expression for individual i’s expected
payoff,
V inti (τ) = τ
1
n
E
[
n∑
i=1
θiq
∗∗
Π (θ) − βk(q
∗∗
Π (θ))
]
+ (1− τ)E
[
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
q∗∗Π (θ)
]
. (8)
Hence, an individual’s expected payoff is a convex combination of the expected profit that is
transferred to individuals and the information rent. In particular, the smaller τ , i.e., the smaller
the fraction of profits that is transferred to individuals, the larger is the contribution of the
information rent to the individuals’ expected payoff.
Ex ante participation constraints. The mechanism designer now aims at surplus maxi-
mization subject to ex ante participation constraints and incentive compatibility constraints.
However, to characterize the outcome of this mechanism design problem, we may ignore the
incentive constraints. As was we already pointed out in the discussion of Proposition 1, incentive
compatibility constraints have no bearing on the ex ante expected utility levels. Consequently,
if there is some mechanism that satisfies the budget constraint and guarantees individuals some
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non-negative expected utility level, then there is also another mechanism that generates these
expected utility levels and is, in addition, incentive compatible.
Obviously, at a solution to the mechanism design problem, all ex ante participation con-
straints are binding. This implies that, for each individual i, E[ti(θ)] = E[θiq(θ)]. Upon
substituting these expected payments in the mechanism designer’s objective function, we find
that he chooses q in order to maximize
E
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ)− βk(q(θ))
]
= E
[
n∑
i=1
θiq(θ)− βk(q(θ))
]
,
i.e., he chooses to provide public goods in a surplus-maximizing way.
Given that, with ex ante participation constraints, individuals are unable to reap an infor-
mation rent, their expected payoff from the ex ante perspective consists entirely of their share
of the first surplus which is given by
V anti (τ) = τ
1
n
E
[
n∑
i=1
θiq
∗(θ) − βk(q∗(θ))
]
. (9)
Note that, whatever τ , the mechanism designer chooses to provide public goods according to
q∗, i.e., public goods provision is surplus-maximizing. Hence, the parameter τ only affects the
distribution of the surplus between the mechanism designer and the individuals, but has no
bearing on the public goods provision rule. In particular, if τ is close to zero, the expected
payoff of individuals is close to zero.
5 Endogenous Conflicts of Interest
In the previous section we did not treat the mechanism designer’s degree of benevolence τ as
a choice variable, but rather as a parameter that makes it possible to define formally what
benevolence and malevolence mean. Obviously, if there was a choice of τ , then a complete
redistribution of profits would be the ideal outcome. There is nothing better than the use of
coercion in conjunction with a benevolent mechanism designer. But this raises the question
whether we can find a more convincing case for participation constraints. The analysis so far
has only shown that the imposition of participation constraint is justified if, for some reason,
the ideal outcome is out of reach.
This issue is taken up in the following. The aim is to develop a more microfounded model
of public goods provision that is empirically plausible and, moreover, endogenously creates a
distributive conflict that justifies the imposition of strong participation constraints.
More specifically, we study an extended model in which the public good is produced by
a firm with private information about its cost function. As a benchmark, we first study the
implications of this extension for a model of mechanism design. We will see that if there is a
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mechanism designer who engages in complete contingent planning of public goods production
and individual payments, then we obtain the same results as in the benchmark model with a
commonly known technology: Coercion is legitimate if and only if the mechanism designer is
sufficiently benevolent.
We will then contrast this result with the following incomplete contracts model: a regulator
delegates public goods production to a profit-maximizing firm, possibly in exchange for an
upfront payment that the firm has to make and which is then transferred to individuals. This
interaction is incomplete, relative to the mechanism design benchmark, because the regulator
remains ignorant with respect to the individuals’ preferences. The fine-tuning of public goods
supply and of individual payments to the state of demand lies in the hands of a profit-maximizing
firm. We show that the firm may be able to extract the whole surplus from public goods
provision, and that this may imply that strong participation constraints should be imposed.
5.1 Mechanism Design
We assume that the firm producing the public good has private information on the parameter
β in the cost function. From an ex ante perspective, the cost parameter β is a random variable
that takes values in a finite ordered set {β1, . . . , βr}, with β1 = r, β2 = r−1, . . ., βr = 1. Hence,
a firm with cost parameter β1 has the worst technology. The probability that β equals βj is in
the following denoted by f(βj) = f j . We assume that the random variable β is stochastically
independent of the vector of taste parameters θ. We impose another monotone hazard rate
assumption: for any j ≥ 1, gj+1 ≤ gj , where, for any j, gj = 1−F (β
j)
f(βj)
.
A mechanism in this extended model consists of a provision rule for the public good q :
(θ, β) 7→ q(θ, β), which specifies how much of the public good is provided as a function of the
vector of taste parameters θ and the firm’s cost parameter β, and a payment rule which specifies
for each individual i, a contribution to the cost of public good provision ti : (θ, β) 7→ ti(θ, β).
The revelation principle implies that it entails no loss of generality to assume that indi-
viduals send messages about their taste parameters and that the firm sends a message about
its cost parameter, and that truth-telling constitutes a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. The incen-
tive compatibility conditions for individual i, are still given by the inequalities in (2), except
that Ti(θˆi) and Qi(θˆi) now also involve expectations about the firm’s cost parameter; i.e.,
Ti(θˆi) := E[ti(θ−i, θˆi, β) | θˆi], and Qi(θˆi) := E[q(θ−i, θˆi, β) | θˆi]. The incentive compatibility
constraints for the firm are as follows: For all β, and all βˆ,
R(β)− βK(β) ≥ R(βˆ)− βK(βˆ) , (10)
where R(βˆ) := E
[∑n
i=1 ti(θ, βˆ) | βˆ
]
is the firm’s expected revenue conditional on announcing a
cost parameter βˆ, and K(βˆ) := E[k(q(θ, βˆ)) | βˆ]. These constraints are based on the assumption
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that the firm is able to manipulate the production costs that are observable to outsiders. If
it claims a cost parameter βˆ and has a true cost parameter β, then its expected production
costs are equal to βK(βˆ). These production costs differ from those of a firm whose true cost
parameter equals βˆ. This difference, however, is assumed to be unobservable to anyone who is
an outsider to the firm.
We require that budget balance holds for each type of firm. Hence, for all β,
R(β)− βK(β) ≥ 0 . (11)
To sum up, in the extended model with private information on preferences and production costs,
any mechanism has to satisfy the budget balance conditions in (11), the individual incentive
compatibility conditions in (2), and the firm’s incentive compatibility conditions in (11). In
addition to these constraints, we may impose participation constraints for individuals in the ex
ante or the ex interim sense.
Proposition 5 A mechanism is constrained efficient if and only if
E
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ, β)
]
= E
[(
β +
1− F (β)
f(β)
)
k(q(θ, β))
]
,
and the public goods provision rule maximizes
E
[(
n∑
i=1
θi
)
q(θ, β) −
(
β +
1− F (β)
f(β)
)
k(q(θ, β))
]
.
This Proposition shows that private information on production costs affects the cost function
on which the analysis of constrained efficient mechanisms is based.15 In the basic model with
a commonly known technology β, the expected costs of public good provision are given by
E[βk(q(θ))]. In the extended model, conditional on β, there is an additional cost which equals
E
[
1−F (β)
f(β) k(q(θ, β)) | β
]
. This additional costs are due to the information rents that the firm is
able to realize.
The proof of Proposition 5, which is in the Appendix, follows from similar arguments as the
proof of Proposition 2. A necessary condition for constrained efficiency is that, for a given public
goods provision rule, the expected payments of individuals are chosen such that E[
∑n
i=1 ti(θ, β)]
is minimized subject to the firm’s budget balance conditions in (11) and the firm’s incentive
compatibility conditions in (10). Moreover, by analyzing a relaxed problem which minimizes
15For the extended model, we use the same definition of constrained efficiency as in the basic model in which
β was assumed to be known, i.e., we follow Baron and Myerson (1982) in that only the expected payoffs of
individuals are of relevance and there is no weight given to rents that the firm may extract.
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E[
∑n
i=1 ti(θ, β)] taking only the budget balance condition for the least efficient firms, i.e., those
with β = β1, and the local downward incentive compatibility conditions,
R(βl)− βlK(βl) ≥ R(βl−1)− βlK(βl−1) .
into account, we find thatE[
∑n
i=1 ti(θ, β)] is bounded from below byE
[(
β + 1−F (β)
f(β)
)
k(q(θ, β))
]
.
Finally, we show that this lower bound can actually be obtained because the provision rule which
solves the relaxed problem satisfies the monotonicity constraint K(βl) ≥ K(βl−1), for all l.
Upon replacing the cost function E[βk(q(θ))] of the basic model by the “virtual” cost function
E
[(
β + 1−F (β)
f(β)
)
k(q(θ, β))
]
which takes account of the firm’s information rent we can not only
reproduce Proposition 1, but all further results of Sections 3 and 4 in the extended model. In
particular, we obtain, once more the conclusions that (i) ex interim participation constraints
can only do harm to individuals if the mechanism designer is benevolent, and (ii) upon reducing
the mechanism designer’s degree of benevolence, we eventually obtain a situation in which the
imposition of strong participation constraints is desirable.
In the following, we will show that a case for ex interim participation constraints arises
endogenously with an incomplete contracts perspective on public goods provision.
5.2 Incomplete Contracts
We now drop the assumption that there is a mechanism designer who specifies public goods
production and individual payments as a function of the firm’s technology and the individuals’
preferences. Instead we assume that there is a regulator who delegates the task of adjusting
the final allocation to the preference intensities of individuals to a profit-maximizing firm, in
exchange for an upfront payment that the firm has to deliver. We assume that the regulator is
benevolent and redistributes this payment to individuals.
The regulator differs from the mechanism designer in that he remains ignorant with respect to
the preferences of individuals and also with respect to the firm’s operating profits; i.e., after the
firm has made its upfront payment it becomes the residual claimant and is no longer monitored
by the regulator. This arrangement is incomplete in the sense that the interaction between the
regulator and the firm is not made contingent on the public goods preferences of individuals.
In the basic model with a commonly known technology, this regulatory approach would make
it possible to reach efficient public goods provision. Given that the firm’s expected profits are
known, the regulator can just require an upfront payment that equals the expected surplus from
efficient public goods provision. This would imply that individuals realize the same expected
payoff as under the symmetric constrained efficient mechanism. Hence, they would legitimize
coercion at the constitutional ex ante stage. We will see, in the following, that this reasoning
breaks down if the firm has private information about its technology.
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The delegation of public goods provision to a self-interested firm is also of interest because it
is a common practice in reality. Public transport is an example for which the question whether
the use of coercion is legitimate or not can be framed as follows: Should public transportation
be organized in such a way that the revenue from the tickets that are sold to customers cover all
of the costs, or is there a role for lump sum payments, i.e., for payments that individuals have
to deliver irrespective of whether or not they make use of public transportation. In the latter
case, there might be people who pay for public transportation, even though they never use it,
and who would hence be better off if there was no public transportation system at all.
Formally, we consider the following sequential structure. First, the firm learns its technol-
ogy and individuals learn their preferences. Then, the regulator asks the firm for an upfront
payment that may possibly depend on the firm’s technology. Finally, the firm interacts with
individuals according to a profit-maximizing mechanism that has to satisfy incentive compati-
bility and participation constraints. Once more, we focus on the question whether, from an ex
ante perspective, individuals prefer the imposition of strong, ex interim participation constraints
over weak, ex ante participation constraints.
We assume, without loss of generality that the interaction between the firm and regulator
is based on a direct revelation mechanism such that the firm reports its cost parameter to the
regulator, and has to deliver a payment Sc(βˆ) that is made contingent on its report. The index
c ∈ {ant, int} refers to the kind of participation constraint that has to be respected. We denote
the firm’s profits by Πc(β).
An implication of the assumption that the regulator does not observe the firm’s profits,
production costs, etc. is that the firm’s upfront payment can not be made contingent on the
firm’s cost parameter. To see this, consider two types of firms β and β′ who are both supposed
to produce the public good. Incentive compatibility requires that
Πc(β)− Sc(β) ≥ Πc(β)− Sc(β′) and Πc(β′)− Sc(β′) ≥ Πc(β′)− Sc(β) .
These inequalities imply that Sc(β) = Sc(β′). In words, if there is a firm of who is supposed to
produce the public good and the firm knows that, if it was less productive, it would still become
the producer of the public good, then it will reveal its high productivity level only if its payment
is not higher than the the one it had to pay if it was less productive. In the following we can
therefore drop the dependence of the upfront payment on the firm’s type, and interpret Sc as
an entry fee that each firm who wants to become the producer of the public good has to pay.
We assume in the following that the upfront payment is set in such a way that each type of
firm participates, i.e., Sc is such that even the firm with the worst technology and therefore the
lowest profits is willing to participate,
Πc(β1)− Sc ≥ 0 .
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In principle, the regulator could require an upfront payment that exceeds Πc(β1). This
would imply that a firm with a bad technology would refrain from becoming the provider of the
public good, so that there would be no public goods provision. From an ex post perspective,
this would be an inefficient outcome because even if β is very high, the marginal cost of public
goods provision converges to zero as the provision level converges to zero. Hence, even with a
bad technology, it would be desirable to have a strictly positive public goods supply. However,
the advantage of choosing Sc strictly larger than Πc(β1) is that it makes it possible to extract a
larger fraction of the profits of firms with a better technology. In general, this tradeoff between
efficiency considerations on the one hand and the desirability of rent extraction on the other,
need not be such that it is optimal to have a positive supply of public goods with each type of
firm. However, if the probability f1 of facing a firm with a bad technology is sufficiently high,
then the scope for rent extraction is limited anyway and the regulator will choose the upfront
payment such that Sc ≤ Πc(β1).
Remark 3 An alternative foundation for this assumption would be that the regulator faces a
commitment problem. The intuition is as follows: Suppose that the regulator sets an upfront
payment that is so high that not all types of the firm are willing to enter. Also, suppose that
the regulator finds himself in the situation that indeed entry has not occurred. Then he knows
that if he lowers the entry fee, eventually the firm will be ready to enter and that this will create
a strictly positive surplus. Lack of commitment means that the regulator is unable to resist
this temptation. Anticipating this behavior, the firm will be willing to produce the public good
only if the payment has been reduced to a level such that each type of firm would be willing to
participate. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a rigorous game-theoretic analysis
of the relationship between the regulator and the firm in the absence of commitment. In the
context of a buyer-seller relationship, these considerations have been formalized by Hart and
Tirole (1988); see also Bolton and Dewatripont (2005).
For the purposes of this paper, the assumption Sc ≤ Πc(β1), is made for ease of exposition.
As will become clear, it is a sufficient condition that makes it possible to show that, with an
incomplete contracts perspective, we may find a role for strong participation constraints.
Proposition 6 For sufficiently large β1, the use of coercion is not legitimate, and public goods
provision should be distorted downwards.
If β1 is large this implies that the least productive firm makes hardly any profit. Given that the
profits of the least productive firm provide an upper bound on the entry fee that the regulator
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charges, this implies that the entry fee converges to zero as β1 goes out of bounds. Consequently,
all other firms can keep the whole profit from public goods provision for themselves. Given this
observation, the arguments from the previous section imply that coercion is not legitimate and
that the firm should face strong, ex interim participation constraints.
Hence, the analysis of the incomplete contracts model can be summarized as follows: If
public goods provision is delegated to a profit-maximizing firm, and moreover, the firm may
credibly claim that its maximal profit is close to zero, then the use of coercion for public goods
finance is not legitimate; i.e., the firm must not be given access to external funds in order to
cover its production costs.
5.3 Proof of Proposition 6
Ex interim participation constraints. We first consider expected payoffs of the firm and
of individuals if ex interim participation constraints have to be respected. A straightforward
extension of the analysis in Section 4 implies that the expected net profits (taking the upfront
payment into account) of a firm of type βl are given by
Π∗int(βl) =
(
max
q∈Q
E
[
n∑
i=1
(
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q(θ)− βk(q(θ)) | β = βl
])
− Sint , (12)
where Q is the set of functions from Θn to R+. An individual’s expected utility at the ex ante
stage can then be written as U inti :=
1
n
Sint+E
[
1−P (θi)
p(θi)
q∗∗Πe(θ, β)
]
, where q∗∗Πe(θ, β) is the level of
public goods provision that results from the profit maximization problem in (12), if the vector
of taste parameters equals θ and the cost parameter equals β.
As in Section 4, the imposition of ex interim participation constraints implies that individuals
get an information rent. This information rent reduces the revenues that a profit-maximizing
firm can realize. As a consequence, the firm chooses a second-best public goods provision level
which falls short of the surplus-maximizing first best level. The information rent also enters the
expected payoff of individuals. In addition, each individual gets an equal share of the upfront
payment that the firm has to deliver.
Ex ante participation constraints. We can also extend the analysis of Section 4 to
determine expected profits and payoffs if ex ante participation constraints are imposed. A type
βl firm then realized expected payoffs of
Π∗ant(βl) =
(
max
q∈Q
E
[(
n∑
i=1
θi
)
q(θ)− βk(q(θ)) | β = βl
])
− Sant , (13)
where Sant ≤ Π∗ant(β1) is the upfront payment in a model with ex ante participation constraints.
The expected utility of individual i is equal to Uanti :=
1
n
Sant.
With the weaker ex ante participation constraints, the firm is able to extract higher payments
from individuals. Individuals no longer get an information rent, which implies that the firm
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chooses a surplus-maximizing public goods provision level q∗e(θ, β). The expected payoff of
individuals is entirely due to the firm’s upfront payment.
Legitimacy of coercion. The use of coercion for public goods finance is legitimate if the
expected payoff of individuals is higher with participation constraints at the ex ante stage, or
equivalently, if
1
n
Sant >
1
n
Sint + E
[
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
q∗∗Πe(θ, β)
]
. (14)
We seek to show that this condition is violated for sufficiently large β1. This follows from the
observation that both Π∗ant(β1) and Π∗int(β1) converge to 0 as β1 goes to ∞. To see this, note
that the first order conditions of the profit maximization problems (12) and (13), respectively,
are
∑n
i=1 θi−
1−P (θi)
p(θi)
β
= k′(q∗∗Πe(θ, β)) and
∑n
i=1 θi
β
= k′(q∗e(θ, β)) .
Hence, as β goes out of bounds, optimal quantities and expected profits go to zero. This implies
that for large β1, condition (14) reduces to
0 > E
[
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
q∗∗Πe(θ, β)
]
,
a contradiction.
6 Concluding Remarks
The analysis has provided an answer to the question whether the financing of public goods should
be subject to participation constraints. The advantage of a system based on participation con-
straints is that all individuals benefit from public goods provision. The disadvantage, however,
is that public goods finance is generally insufficient to induce efficient outcomes. Which of these
two forces is dominating depends on whether or not there are pronounced agency problems be-
tween individuals and the institution in charge of public goods provision. If the latter acts in the
individuals’ best interests, then the imposition on participation constraint is not attractive. By
contrast, if it seeks to maximize his own payoff at the expense of individuals, then participation
constraints should be imposed. Finally, we have shown that, under certain assumptions, if the
production of public goods is delegated to a monopolistic firm with private information about
its production costs, the latter case applies; that is, a regulated monopolist should not be given
access to public funds.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Only if - part. We show that for every constrained efficient mechanism the budget constraint is binding
and the provision rule is surplus-maximizing.
Without loss of generality of we can characterize a Parto-efficient mechanism as the solution of the
following optimization problem: Choose a mechanism in order to maximize E[θ1q(θ) − t1(θ)] subject
to the incentive compatibility constraints in (2), the budget constraint in (1) and the following set of
reservation utility constraints: For each i 6= 1,
E[θiq(θ)− ti(θ)] ≥ u¯i , (15)
for some given vector of reservation utility levels (u¯2, . . . , u¯n).
Consider a relaxed problem which does not include the incentive compatibility constraints. As is well-
known in the literature the solution to this relaxed problem is such that the budget constraint in (1) and
the constraints in (15) are binding. Moreover, public goods provision has to be surplus-maximizing. In the
following we show that this solution can also be achieved subject to incentive compatibility constraints.
The surplus-maximizing provision rule satisfies q(θ−i, θ
l) < q(θ−i, θ
l+1), for all i and l. This implies
that for all i, and all l, the monotonicity constrained Qi(θ
l+1) > Qi(θ
l), is satisfied.
Given this provision rule, if we choose the expected payments of each individual i in such a way that
all local downward incentive compatibility constraints are binding,
θlQi(θ
l)− Ti(θ
l) = θlQi(θ
l−1)− Ti(θ
l−1),
25
then Lemma 2 in part B of the Appendix implies that the resulting allocation is incentive compatible,
and Lemma 3 implies that the expected utility of individual i is given by
E[θiq(θ)− ti(θ)] = E
[(
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q(θ)
]
− Ti(θ
0) .
Consequently, if we choose for each i 6= 1, Ti(θ
0) such that
E
[(
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q(θ)
]
− Ti(θ
0) = u¯i
and for all l > 0,
Ti(θ
l) = θl(Qi(θ
l)−Qi(θ
l−1)) + Ti(θ
l−1) ,
then the resulting allocation is incentive compatible and yields for each individual i 6= 1, the same
expected utility as the solution of the relaxed problem. We proceed in a similar way with individual 1,
except that the utility level for individual 1, u∗1, follows from the solution of the relaxed problem and is
given by
u∗1 = E
[
n∑
i=1
θiq
∗(θ)− βk(q∗(θ))
]
−
n∑
i=2
u¯i . (16)
It remains to be shown that the payments are such that the budget constraint holds as an equality. By
construction, E[ti(θ)] = E[θiq
∗(θ)]− u¯i, for i 6= 1, and E[t1(θ)] = E[θ1q
∗(θ)]− u∗1. This implies that
E
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ)
]
= E
[
n∑
i=1
θiq
∗(θ)
]
−
(
u∗1 +
n∑
i=2
u¯i
)
(16)
= E [βk(q∗(θ))] .
If-Part. We now show that every incentive compatible mechanism such that the provision rule is
surplus-maximizing and the budget constraint holds as an equality is constrained efficient.
The proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose that (q, t1, . . . , tn) is an incentive compatible mecha-
nism such that q is surplus-maximizing and the budget constraint holds as an equality. Suppose there
exists an incentive compatible mechanism (q′, t′1, . . . , t
′
n) such that, for all i,
E[θiq
′(θ)− t′i(θ)] ≥ E[θiq(θ)− ti(θ)] ,
with a strict inequality for some i. This implies that
E
[
n∑
i=1
(θiq
′(θ)− t′i(θ))
]
> E
[
n∑
i=1
(θiq(θ)− ti(θ))
]
,
Using that E [
∑n
i=1 ti(θ))] = E[βk(q(θ))], and that E [
∑n
i=1 t
′
i(θ))] ≥ E[βk(q
′(θ))], this implies that
E
[
n∑
i=1
θiq
′(θ)− βk(q′(θ))
]
> E
[
n∑
i=1
θiq(θ)− βk(q(θ))
]
,
hence a contradiction to the assumption that q is a surplus-maximizing provision rule.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Only if - part. By Proposition 1, under every constrained efficient mechanism the provision rule is equal
to q∗. Given this provision rule, Lemma 7 in part B of the Appendix implies that the maximal revenue
that is possible in the presence of ex interim participation constraints equals
E
[
n∑
i=1
(
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q∗(θ)
]
.
If this is smaller than E[βk(q∗(θ))], budget balance can not be achieved. Hence, constrained efficiency
can not be achieved.
If - part. We need to show that if
E
[
n∑
i=1
(
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q∗(θ)
]
≥ E[βk(q∗(θ))] .
then, given the surplus-maximizing provision rule q∗, (t1, . . . , tn) can be chosen such that the budget
constraint binds and that for all i, the incentive compatibility constraints and the ex interim participation
constraints are satisfied.
By the arguments in the proof of Lemma 7, the participation constraints of individual i are satisfied
if and only if Ti(θ
0) ≤ 0. Since the provision rule q∗ implies that the monotonicity constraints Qi(θ
l) ≥
Qi(θ
l−1) are satisfied for all i and l, Lemmas 2 and 3 in part B of the Appendix imply that incentive
compatibility holds if expected payments are chosen such that all local downward incentive compatibility
constraints are binding and that the expected payments of individual i are in this case equal to
E[ti(θ)] = E
[(
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q(θ)
]
+ Ti(θ
0) .
Now choose
Ti(θ
0) =
1
n
(
E[βk(q∗(θ))]− E
[
n∑
i=1
(
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q∗(θ)
])
,
for all i. By assumption this is smaller or equal to zero, so that the ex interim participation constraints are
satisfied, for all i. It remains to be shown that budget balance holds. This follows since, by construction,
E
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ)
]
= E
[
n∑
i=1
(
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q∗(θ)
]
+
(
E[βk(q∗(θ))]− E
[
n∑
i=1
(
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q∗(θ)
])
.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Step 1. At a solution to the second best problem, the budget constraint has to be binding. Otherwise it
would be possible to reduce the expected payments of individuals without violating any of the incentive
compatibility or participation constraints, and without violating the budget constraint. Hence, at a
solution to the second best problem
E
[∑
i=1
(θiq(θ)− ti(θ))
]
= E
[(∑
i=1
θi
)
q(θ)− βk(q(θ))
]
.
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Step 2. The expected revenue E[
∑n
i=1 ti(θ)] at a solution of the second best problem satisfies
E
[
n∑
i=1
(
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q(θ)
]
≥ E[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ)] .
This follows from the arguments in the proof of Lemma 7 in Appendix B , which imply, that if, for a
given provision rule q, E[
∑n
i=1 ti(θ)] is maximized taking only a subset of the constraints of the sec-
ond best problem – namely the ex interim participation constraints and the local downward incentive
compatibility constraints – into account, then the maximal revenue equals E
[∑n
i=1
(
θi −
1−P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q(θ)
]
.
This expression is therefore an upper bound on the expected payments of individuals. Combining this
observation and the budget constraint yields
E
[
n∑
i=1
(
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q(θ)
]
≥ E[βk(q(θ))] . (17)
Step 3. Steps 1 and 2 imply that the surplus that is generated at a solution of the auxiliary problem to
maximize E [(
∑
i=1 θi) q(θ)− βk(q(θ))] subject to the constraint in (17) is an upper bound on the second
best surplus. Moreover, it is straightforward to verify that (17) is binding if and only if
E
[
n∑
i=1
(
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q∗(θ)
]
< E[βk(q∗(θ))] .
Step 4. Suppose that (17) is not binding. Then provision rule q∗ and the payments in the mechanism in
the proof of the if-part of Proposition 2 solve the auxiliary problem. Moreover, with this mechanism the
surplus of public goods provision is shared equally among individuals, i.e., for all i,
E[θiq(θ)− ti(θ)] =
1
n
E
[
n∑
i=1
θiq
∗(θ)− βk(q∗(θ))
]
.
This proves the first statement in Proposition 3.
Step 5. Now suppose that (17) is binding. The provision rule that solves the auxiliary problem
satisfies the monotonicity constraint, Qi(θ
l) ≥ Qi(θ
l−1), for all i, and l. This follows because the optimal
level of q(θ) is either equal to zero or given by the first order condition,
βk′(q(θ)) =
n∑
i=1
θi −
λ
1 + λ
n∑
i=1
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
where λ is the multiplier on the constraint. The assumption that the hazard rate is decreasing implies
that whenever, for one individual the taste parameter θl is replaced by the taste parameter θl+1, the
right hand side goes up, which implies that q(θ−i, θ
l) ≤ q(θ−i, θ
l+1), for all i, θ−i, and l. This implies,
in particular, that Qi(θ
l) ≤ Qi(θ
l−1), for all i, and l. This follows from Lemma 7 in Appendix B, this
implies that the the surplus that is generated by the auxiliary problem can be achieved by a second
best mechanism. Moreover, the arguments in the proof of this Lemma show that this requires that for
all i, the ex interim Participation constraint Ti(θ
0) ≤ 0 and all local downward incentive compatibility
constraints are binding. Lemma 3 in Appendix B implies that, at a solution to the second best problem,
for all i, ex ante expected utility is equal to
E[θiq(θ)− ti(θ)] = E
[
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
q∗∗(θ)
]
(18)
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where q∗∗(θ) is the provision rule that solves the auxiliary problem. Given that the constraint of the
auxiliary problem is binding we have
E
[
n∑
i=1
(
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q∗∗(θ)
]
= E[βk(q∗∗(θ))] ,
or, equivalently,
E
[
n∑
i=1
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
q∗∗(θ)
]
= E
[(
n∑
i=1
θi
)
q∗∗(θ)− βk(q∗∗(θ))
]
Using that the random variables (θi)
n
i=1 are independently and identically distributed, this implies that
E
[
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
q∗∗(θ)
]
=
1
n
E
[(
n∑
i=1
θi
)
q∗∗(θ)− βk(q∗∗(θ))
]
(19)
Equations (18) and (19) imply that at a solution to the second best problem,
E[θiq(θ)− ti(θ)] =
1
n
E
[(
n∑
i=1
θi
)
q∗∗(θ)− βk(q∗∗(θ))
]
.
By definition of the surplus-maximizing provision rule q∗, q∗∗ 6= q∗ implies that this is less than the ex
ante expected payoff under the symmetric constraint efficient mechanism.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof uses arguments from part B of the Appendix, in particular Lemmas 1 - 7, which provide a
characterization of incentive compatible mechanisms and of revenue maximizing mechanisms.
The optimal mechanism with ex interim participation constraints. It follows from Lemma
5, that, at a solution to the mechanism design problem, for all i, the participation constraints in (3) are
binding for θi = θ
0 and is slack otherwise. Otherwise it would be possible to increase the monopolist’s
revenue while holding the monopolist’s provision rule fixed.
Consider the relaxed problem of choosing (q, t1, . . . , tn) in order to maximize Π subject to the down-
ward incentive compatibility constraints in (24) and the ex interim participation constraints in (3). It
follows from Lemma 6 that at a solution to this problem, all downward incentive compatibility constraints
are binding, and the participation constraint in (3) is binding for θi = θ
0 and is slack otherwise. Other-
wise it would be possible to increase the monopolist’s revenue while holding the monopolist’s provision
rule fixed. But then the arguments in the proof of Lemma 7 imply that the expected revenue of the mo-
nopolist, at a solution to the relaxed problem, is equal to E [
∑n
i=1 ti(θ)] = E
[∑n
i=1
(
θi −
1−P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q(θ)
]
.
Hence, the provision rule which is part of the solution of the relaxed problem maximizes
Π = E
[
n∑
i=1
(
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q(θ)− βk(q(θ))
]
.
In the following this provision rule is denoted by q∗∗Π .
The relaxed problem takes only a subset of all incentive compatibility constraints into account. Hence,
the expected profits that are generated by the mechanism which solves the relaxed problem are an upper
bound on the expected profits that are generated by the mechanism that solves the “full” problem of
maximizing Π subject to all participation and incentive compatibility constraints.
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It follows from Lemma 2 that if the provision rule q∗∗Π is such that the monotonicity constraints
Qi(θ
l) ≥ Qi(θ
l−1) are satisfied for all i and l, then the solution to the relaxed problem satisfies all
incentive compatibility constraints and is hence also a solution to the full problem.
In the remainder we verify that under q∗∗Π the monotonicity constraints are indeed satisfied. For every
given θ, q∗∗Π (θ) is either given by the first order condition,
n∑
i=1
(
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
= βk′(q∗∗Π (θ)) , (20)
or, if this equation has only a negative solution, equal to 0. Given that hl < hl−1, for all l, for each i,
the left-hand side of the first order condition is strictly increasing in θi. Given that k is increasing and
convex, this implies that, for each i and each l, q∗∗Π (θ−i, θ
l) < q∗∗Π (θ−i, θ
l+1), and, as a consequence, the
monotonicity constraint Qi(θ
l+1) > Qi(θ
l) holds for all i, and all l.
Given that all local downward incentive compatibility constraints and the participation constraints
for θi = θ
0 are binding for all i (so that Ti(θ
0) = 0), it follows from Lemma 3 that E[θiq(θ)− ti(θ)]+
τ
n
Π∗
is equal to
E
[
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
q∗∗(θ)
]
+
τ
n
E
[
n∑
i=1
(
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q∗∗(θ)− βk(q∗∗(θ))
]
Exploiting that the random variables (θi)
n
i=1 are iid and rearranging term yields the expression for
expected payoffs of individuals in equation (8).
The optimal mechanism with ex ante participation constraints We first consider a re-
laxed problem of maximizing Π taking only the ex ante participation constraints in (4) into account.
Obviously, this implies that, for each i, the participation constraint has to be binding, for each i,
E[ti(θ)] = E[θiq(θ)]. Using this expression to substitute for E[ti(θ)] in the definition of Π yields
Π = E [(
∑n
i=1 θi) q(θ)− βk(q(θ))]. Hence, q
∗ is the profit-maximizing provision rule.
In the following we show that the there is a mechanism which is payoff equivalent to the solution of
this relaxed problem and satisfies all incentive compatibility constraints.
The surplus-maximizing provision rule q∗ is such that for each i, Qi(θ
l) ≤ Qi(θ
l+1). If all local down-
ward incentive compatibility constraints hold as an equality, then all incentive compatibility constraints
are satisfied. This follows from Lemma 2. To complete the proof it suffices show that, given public goods
provision according to q∗, there is a payoff equivalent mechanism which is such that all local downward
incentive compatibility constraints hold as an equality.
If all local downward incentive constraints are binding, then the arguments in the proof of Lemma 2
imply that Ti(θ
l) = θlQi(θ
l)−
∑l−1
k=0Qi(θ
k) + Ti(θ
0), for all l, and hence
E[ti(θ)] = E
[(
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q∗(θ)
]
+ Ti(θ
0) . (21)
Now if we let, in addition, Ti(θ
0) = E
[
1−P (θi)
p(θi)
q∗(θ)
]
, then also the ex ante participation constraints of
all individuals are binding. This also implies that for each individual E[θiq
∗(θ)− ti(θ)] = 0 and expected
profits are equal to Π∗ = E [(
∑n
i=1 θi) q
∗(θ)− βk(q∗(θ))]. The ex ante expected payoff of individuals
consists entirely of the fraction of profits that they receive. This observation yields the expression for
expected utility in equation (9).
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Comparison of expected utilities. Using equations (9) and (8) we find that V anti (τ)− V
int
i (τ) is
equal to
τ
1
n
(
E
[(
n∑
i=1
θi
)
q∗(θ)− βk(q∗(θ))
]
− E
[(
n∑
i=1
θi
)
q∗∗Π (θ)− βk(q
∗∗
Π (θ))
])
−(1− τ)E
[(
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q∗∗Π (θ)
]
Since q∗ maximizes the surplus from public goods provision, this expression is increasing in τ . Moreover,
it is negative for τ close to zero and positive for τ close to 1.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Step 1. We show that, for any mechanism satisfying the the budget balance conditions in (11) and the
firm’s incentive compatibility conditions in (10), E [
∑n
i=1 ti(θ, β)] ≥ E
[(
β + 1−F (β)
f(β)
)
k(q(θ, β))
]
.
Let q be an arbitrary given provision rule and consider the relaxed problem of minimizingE [
∑n
i=1 ti(θ, β)]
subject to the budget balance condition for β = β1 and the local downward incentive compatibility condi-
tions for the firm, R(βl)−βlK(βl) ≥ R(βl−1)−βlK(βl−1), for all l. Since this minimization problem takes
only a subset of all budget balance conditions and all firm incentive compatibility conditions into account,
the solution of this minimization problem will be a lower bound to the minimal value of E [
∑n
i=1 ti(θ, β)]
that can be obtained if all budget and incentive constraints are taken into account.
At a solution to the relaxed problem all constraints have to be binding. Otherwise it was possible
to reduce the expected revenues for some type of firm without violating any of the constraints of the
relaxed problem, thereby attaining a lower value of E [
∑n
i=1 ti(θ, β)]. This makes it possible to verify
that R(βl) = βlK(βl) +
∑l−1
j=1K(β
j), for l ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1}, and that R(β1) = β1K(β1). Using the law
of iterated expectations, we obtain
E
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ, β)
]
=
r∑
l=1
f lR(βl) = E [βk(q(θ, β))] +
r∑
l=2
f l
l−1∑
j=1
K(βj)
= E [βk(q(θ, β))] +
r∑
l=1
(1− F (βl))K(βl)
= E [βk(q(θ, β))] +
r∑
l=1
f l
1− F (βl)
f(βl)
K(βl)
= E
[(
β +
1− F (β)
f(β)
)
k(q(θ, β))
]
.
Step 2. Suppose public goods provision is such that the following monotonicity constraint holds:
For all l, K(βl) ≥ K(βl−1). We show that, under this assumption, there is a mechanism such that
E [
∑n
i=1 ti(θ, β)] = E
[(
β + 1−F (β)
f(β)
)
k(q(θ, β))
]
, satisfying the budget balance conditions in (11) and the
firm’s incentive compatibility conditions in (10),
Using arguments that are analogous to those in the proof of Lemma 4 in part B of the Appendix we
find that if the firm’s budget balance condition holds for β = β1, then it also holds for all β 6= β1. The
fact that all local downward incentive compatibility constraints are binding and that the monotonicity
constraint K(βl) ≥ K(βl−1) holds for all l, implies that all firm incentive compatibility conditions are
satisfied. This follows from similar arguments as Lemmas 1 and 2 in part B of the Appendix.
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Given Steps 1 and 2, The arguments that are needed to complete the proof of Proposition 5 are a
straightforward modification of the arguments that were used to in the proof of Proposition 1. Hence,
we only sketch the arguments.
The first observation is that if in Proposition 1 we replace the budget condition (1) by the budget
condition
E
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ, β)
]
≥ E
[(
β +
1− F (β)
f(β)
)
k(q(θ, β))
]
(22)
we obtain the following result: A mechanism is Pareto-efficient among those that satisfy the individuals’
incentive compatibility conditions as well as the budget constraint (22) if and only if the constraint (22)
binds, and the public goods provision rule maximizes the “‘virtual surplus”
E
[(
n∑
i=1
θi
)
q(θ, β) −
(
β +
1− F (β)
f(β)
)
k(q(θ, β))
]
.
Denote this provision rule in the following by q∗e .
To obtain this result we need to show that the lower bound on payments identified in Step 1 can be
reached. By Step 2, this is the case if q∗e is such that for all l, K(β
l) ≥ K(βl−1). To verify this property,
note that, for any (θ, β), q∗e(θ, β) is characterized by the following first order condition,∑n
i=1 θi
β + 1−F (β)
f(β)
= k′(q∗e(θ, β)) .
By the monotone hazard rate assumption the left hand side is decreasing in β. Hence, conditional on θ,
a larger value of β implies that less of the public good is provided. Given our assumption that βl < βl−1,
this means that, for every θ, q∗e(θ, β
l) > q∗e(θ, β
l−1). This implies, in particular that K(βl) ≥ K(βl−1).
32
B Further Results
B.1 Characterization of Incentive Compatible Mechanisms
Lemma 1 For all i, the incentive constraints in (2) hold if the following local incentive constraints are
satisfied: For any l < m,
θlQi(θ
l)− Ti(θ
l) ≥ θlQi(θ
l+1)− Ti(θ
l+1) , (23)
and, for any l > 0,
θlQi(θ
l)− Ti(θ
l) ≥ θlQi(θ
l−1)− Ti(θ
l−1) . (24)
Moreover, the local incentive constraints (23) and (24) imply that, for all i, Qi(θ
l) ≥ Qi(θ
l−1), for all
l > 1.
Proof We first show that for each i and for each l, Qi(θ
l) ≥ Qi(θ
l−1). This follows from adding (23)
for θi = θ
l (as stated in the Lemma) and (24) for θi = θ
l+1,
θl+1Qi(θ
l+1)− Ti(θ
l+1) ≥ θl+1Qi(θ
l)− Ti(θ
l) .
We now show that (23) implies that
θlQi(θ
l)− Ti(θ
l) ≥ θlQi(θ
l+2)− Ti(θ
l+2) , (25)
To see this, rewrite (23) as
θlQi(θ
l)− Ti(θ
l) ≥ θl+1Qi(θ
l+1)− Ti(θ
l+1)− (θl+1 − θl)Qi(θ
l+1) ,
Since Qi(θ
l+2) ≥ Qi(θ
l+1) we also have
θlQi(θ
l)− Ti(θ
l) ≥ θl+1Qi(θ
l+1)− Ti(θ
l+1)− (θl+1 − θl)Qi(θ
l+2) ,
Moreover, condition (23) for θi = θ
l+1 is
θl+1Qi(θ
l+1)− Ti(θ
l+1) ≥ θl+1Qi(θ
l+2)− Ti(θ
l+2) ,
Adding the last two inequalities yields
θlQi(θ
l)− Ti(θ
l) ≥ θlQi(θ
l+2)− Ti(θ
l+2)
Hence, an individual with preference parameter θl does not benefit from announcing θl+2. Iterating this
argument one more establishes that this individual does neither benefit from announcing θl+3, etc.
The proof that an individual with preference parameter θl does not benefit from announcing θl−j for any
j ≥ 1 is analogous and left to the reader.
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Lemma 2 Suppose that, for some individual i, all local downward incentive compatibility constraints
are binding and that Qi(θ
l) ≥ Qi(θ
l−1), for all l > 1. Then all incentive compatibility constraints of
individual i are satisfied.
Proof If all local downward incentive constraints are binding for individual i, this implies that, for all
l ≥ 1,
Ti(θ
l) =
l∑
k=1
θk(Qi(θ
k)−Qi(θ
k−1)) + Ti(θ
0) . (26)
Using that θ0 = 0 and that θl+1 − θl = 1, for all l > 0, equation (26) can be equivalently written as
Ti(θ
l) = θlQi(θ
l)−
l−1∑
k=0
Qi(θ
k) + Ti(θ
0) . (27)
To establish incentive compatibility, Lemma 1 implies that it suffices to show that all local upward
incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied, i.e., for all l,
θlQi(θ
l)− Ti(θ
l) ≥ θlQi(θ
l+1)− Ti(θ
l+1) .
or, equivalently,
θlQi(θ
l)− Ti(θ
l) ≥ θl+1Qi(θ
l+1)− Ti(θ
l+1)−Qi(θ
l+1) .
By equation (27), this inequality can also be written as
l−1∑
k=0
Qi(θ
k) ≥
l∑
k=0
Qi(θ
k)−Qi(θ
l+1) ,
or
Qi(θ
l+1) ≥ Qi(θ
l) .
These monotonicity constraints are satisfied by assumption.
Lemma 3 If for individual i, all local downward incentive compatibility constraints are binding, then the
expected utility of individual i from the ex ante perspective is given by
E[θiq(θ)− ti(θ)] = E
[(
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q(θ)
]
− Ti(θ
0)
Proof Equation (27) in the proof of Lemma 2 and the law of iterated expectations imply that,
E[ti(θ)] =
m∑
j=0
pjTi(θ
j)
=
m∑
j=0
pjθjQi(θ
j)−
m∑
j=1
pj
j−1∑
k=0
Qi(θ
k) + Ti(θ
0)
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= E[θiq(θ)]−
m∑
j=1
(
1−
j∑
k=0
pj
)
Qi(θ
j) + Ti(θ
0)
= E[θiq(θ)]−
m∑
j=1
pj
1−
∑j
k=0 p
j
pj
Qi(θ
j) + Ti(θ
0)
= E[θiq(θ)]− E
[(
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q(θ)
]
+ Ti(θ
0) .
B.2 Characterization of Revenue Maximizing Mechanisms for a given provi-
sion rule
Lemma 4 For all i, if the participation constraint in (3) is satisfied for θi = θ
0 then it is also satisfied
for all θi 6= θ
0.
Proof Let θi 6= θ
0. Then, by the incentive compatibility constraints in (2),
θiQi(θi)− Ti(θi) ≥ θiQi(θ
0)− Ti(θ
0) .
Moreover, θi > θ
0 implies that the right-hand side of this inequality exceeds
θ0Qi(θ
0)− Ti(θ
0) ,
which is nonnegative by the participation constraint for θi = θ
0. This proves that (3) is not binding for
θi 6= θ
0.
Lemma 5 Let q be an arbitrary given provision rule. Consider the problem of choosing a mechanism
(t1, . . . , tn) in order to maximize total revenue
E
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ)
]
subject to subject to the incentive compatibility constraints in (2) and the ex interim participation con-
straints in (3). At a solution to this problem, the participation constraint in (3) is binding for θi = θ
0
and is slack otherwise.
Proof By Lemma 4 we only need to show that it is binding for θi = θ
0. We show that it is possible
to increase the expected payments of individual i in an incentive compatible way if, for some i, the
participation constraint for θi = θ
0 does not hold as an equality. It is instructive to rewrite the incentive
compatibility constraints in (2) as follows: For each i, for each θi ∈ Θ, and for each θˆi ∈ Θ,
θiQi(θi)− θiQi(θˆi) ≥ Ti(θi)− Ti(θˆi), (28)
Consider a new payment rule for individual i such that for each θi ∈ Θ, Ti(θi) increases by some ǫ > 0,
this implies that the right hand side of the incentive constraints in (28) remains constant, i.e., the increase
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of i’s expected payments does not upset incentive compatibility. Since revenue increase in the expected
payments of individual i, the revenue maximizing mechanism must be such that a binding participation
constraint for θi = θ
0 prevents a further increase of individual i’s payments.
Lemma 6 Let q be an arbitrary given provision rule. Consider the “relaxed problem” of choosing a
mechanism (t1, . . . , tn) in order to maximize total revenue
E
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ)
]
subject to the downward incentive compatibility constraints in (24) and the ex interim participation con-
straints in (3). At a solution to this problem, all downward incentive compatibility constraints are binding,
and the participation constraint in (3) is binding for θi = θ
0 and is slack otherwise.
Proof It is straightforward to verify that, for all i, all downward incentive compatibility constraints are
binding. Otherwise the expected payments of some individual could be increased without violating any
one of the constraints of the relaxed problem. It remains to be shown that, for all i, the participation
constraint in (3) is binding for θi = θ
0 and is slack otherwise. By Lemma 4 we only need to show that, for
all i, the participation constraint in (3) is binding for θi = θ
0. Suppose otherwise. Then it was possible
to increase Ti(θ
0) without violating any constraint.
Lemma 7 Let q be a given provision rule with the property that for all i, and all l, the monotonicity
constraints Qi(θ
l) ≥ Qi(θ
l−1) are satisfied. Consider the problem of choosing (t1, . . . , tn) in order to
maximize the total revenue
E
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ)
]
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints in (2) and the ex interim participation constraints in
(3). The maximal revenue at a solution to this problem is equal to
E
[
n∑
i=1
(
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q(θ)
]
.
Proof First, consider the “relaxed problem” of maximizing subject to the local downward incentive
constraints (24) and the the ex interim participation constraints in (3). The arguments in the proofs
of Lemmas 4 - 6 imply that, for all i, all local downward incentive constraints as well as the ex interim
participation constraints are binding for θi = θ
0.16
Since the given provision rule q satisfies the monotonicity constraints Qi(θ
l) ≥ Qi(θ
l−1) for all i and
l, Lemma 2 implies that all incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied at a solution to the relaxed
problem. Hence, the solution to the relaxed problem is the revenue maximizing mechanism.
16In these Lemmas the provision rule for the public good is not taken as given. However, this does not affect
the logic of the argument.
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Given that all local downward incentive compatibility constraints are binding, Lemma 3 implies that,
for all i,
E[ti(θ)] = E
[(
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q(θ)
]
+ Ti(θ
0)
Since the participation constraints are binding, for all i, whenever θi = θ
0, we have Ti(θ
0) = 0, for all i,
and hence
E
[
n∑
i=1
(
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q(θ)
]
.
B.3 On the impossibility to reach constrained efficiency subject to interim
participation constraints with many individuals
Lemma 8 Let (kn)
∞
n=1 be a sequence of cost functions, with the understanding that kn is the cost function
that applies if the number of individuals is equal to n. Suppose that the sequence (kn)
∞
n=1 converges
pointwise to a cost function k∞. Let q
∗
n be the surplus maximizing provision rule for an economy with n
individuals. Suppose that (kn)
∞
n=1 converges pointwise to a cost function k∞ and that
lim
n→∞
1
n
E[βkn(q
∗
n(θ))] > 0 .
Then there exists n′, such that for all n > n′,
1
n
E
[
n∑
i=1
(
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q∗n(θ)
]
<
1
n
E[βkn(q
∗
n(θ))] .
Proof We show in the following that
lim
n→∞
1
n
E
[
n∑
i=1
(
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q∗n(θ)
]
= 0 .
By the strong law of large numbers 1
n
∑n
i=1 θi converges in probability to E[θi], and
1
n
∑n
i=1
1−P (θi)
p(θi)
converges in probability to E
[
1−P (θi)
p(θi)
]
. Moreover, E
[
1−P (θi)
p(θi)
]
= E[θi]. To see this, note that
E
[
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
]
=
m∑
l=0
pl
1− P (θl)
pl
=
m∑
l=0
m∑
k=l+1
pk =
m∑
l=0
lpl =
m∑
l=0
θlpl .
Hence,
lim
n→∞
1
n
E
[
n∑
i=1
(
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)]
= 0 .
To complete the proof, note that q∗n(θ) converges in probability to a deterministic public goods provision
level. This follows since (i) for every given n, q∗n(θ) is characterized by the first order condition
1
n
∑n
i=1 θi =
1
n
βk′n(q
∗(θ)), (ii) 1
n
∑n
i=1 θi converges in probability to E[θi], and (iii) (kn)
∞
n=1 converges pointwise to
k∞.
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By Proposition 2 there is no constrained efficient mechanism that satisfies the ex interim participation
constraints whenever
1
n
E
[
n∑
i=1
(
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q∗n(θ)
]
<
1
n
E[βkn(q
∗
n(θ))] .
In conjunction with Lemma 8 this implies that for sufficiently large n, constrained efficiency is incompat-
ible with the ex interim participation constraints.
B.4 A model with profit-sharing ex post
The basic model is such that individuals receive a share τ
n
of the expected monopoly profits which does
not depend on their behavior under the mechanism that the monopolist proposes. In this section of
the Appendix we investigate an alternative model which is such that individuals receive a share of the
profits that the mechanism designer realizes ex post and which therefore depends on the vector of taste
parameters θ. This implies that an individual’s incentives under the mechanism are complicated by the
dependence of profits on the own announcement. The incentive compatibility constraints are now as
follows: for each i, for each θi ∈ Θ, and for each θˆi ∈ Θ,
θiQi(θi)− Ti(θi) +
τ
n
Πi(θi) ≥ θiQi(θˆi)− Ti(θˆi) +
τ
n
Πi(θˆi), (29)
where
Πi(θˆi) := E
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ−i, θˆi)− βk(q(θ−i, θˆi)) | θˆi
]
are the expected profits from the perspective of individual i.
We want to show in the following that (i) this model is well-defined only if profits are included in the
participation constraints i.e., the participation constraints are such that, for all i and all θi
θiQi(θi)− Ti(θi) +
τ
n
Πi(θi) ≥ 0 (30)
as opposed to
θiQi(θi)− Ti(θi) ≥ 0 , (31)
and (ii) that if the model is well defined, then it gives the same results as the basic model under the
assumption that τ = 0.
Proposition 7 The mechanism that maximizes Π subject to the incentive constraints in (29), and the
interim participation constraints (30) has the following properties.
i) For all i, the participation constraint for θi = θ
0 is binding and the participation constraints for
θi 6= θ
0 are not binding.
ii) For all i, all local downward incentive constraints are binding; i.e., for all l > 0,
θlQi(θ
l)− Ti(θ
l) +
τ
n
Πi(θ
l) = θlQi(θ
l−1)− Ti(θ
l−1) +
τ
n
Πi(θ
l−1) ,
and all other incentive compatibility constraints are not binding.
iii) The profit maximizing provision rule is given by q∗∗Π .
iv) For all τ < 1, the expected after tax profits are given as
(1− τ)Π∗ = E
[(
n∑
i=1
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q∗∗Π (θ)− βk(q
∗∗
Π (θ))
]
v) For all τ < 1, the expected payoff of individual i from the ex ante perspective, is given by
E
[(
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q∗∗Π (θ)
]
B.4.1 Proof of Proposition 7
The proof follows from the series of Lemmas below.
Lemma 9 For all i, the participation constraint in (30) is binding if θi = θ
0 and is slack otherwise.
Proof Let θi 6= θ
0. Then, by the incentive compatibility constraints in (29),
θiQi(θi)− Ti(θi) +
τ
n
Πi(θi) ≥ θiQi(θ
0)− Ti(θ
0) +
τ
n
Πi(θ
0) .
Moreover, θi > θ
0 implies that the right-hand side of this inequality exceeds
θ0Qi(θ
0)− Ti(θ
0) +
τ
n
Πi(θ
0) ,
which is nonnegative by the participation constraint for θi = θ
0, and the fact that the maximal profit-level
is non-negative because the monopolist can always ensure zero profits by choosing q ≡ 0. This proves
that (30) is not binding for θi 6= θ
0.
Now suppose that θi = θ
0. We show that it is possible to increase the expected payments of individual i
in an incentive compatible way if, for some i, the participation constraint for θi = θ
0 does not hold as an
equality. It is instructive to rewrite the incentive compatibility constraints in (29) as follows: For each i,
for each θi ∈ Θ, and for each θˆi ∈ Θ,
θiQi(θi)−
(
1−
τ
n
)
Ti(θi) +
τ
n
Π′i(θi) ≥ θiQi(θˆi)−
(
1−
τ
n
)
Ti(θˆi) +
τ
n
Π′i(θˆi), (32)
where
Π′i(θˆi) = E

∑
j 6=i
tj(θ−i, θˆi)− βk(q(θ−i, θˆi)) | θˆi


does not include the payments of individual i. (32) can equivalently be written as: For each i, for each
θi ∈ Θ, and for each θˆi ∈ Θ,
θiQi(θi) +
τ
n
Π′i(θi)− θiQi(θˆi)−
τ
n
Π′i(θˆi) ≥
(
1−
τ
n
)
(Ti(θi)− Ti(θˆi)), (33)
Now fix the provision rule for the public good and the payments of all individuals j, j 6= i. This implies
that for all of the incentive constraints in (33), the left hand side remains constant. Now, if the monopolist
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chooses a new payment rule for individual i such that for each θi ∈ Θ, Ti(θi) increases by some ǫ > 0,
this implies that also the right hand side of the incentive constraints in (33) remains constant, i.e., the
increase of i’s expected payments does not upset incentive compatibility. Since monopoly profits increase
in the expected payments of individual i, the profit-maximizing mechanism must be such that a binding
participation constraint for θi = θ
0 prevents a further increase of individual i’s payments.
Lemma 10 For all i, the incentive constraints in (29) hold if the following local incentive constraints
are satisfied: For any l < m,
θlQi(θ
l)− Ti(θ
l) +
τ
n
Πi(θ
l) ≥ θlQi(θ
l+1)− Ti(θ
l+1) +
τ
n
Πi(θ
l+1) , (34)
and, for any l > 0,
θlQi(θ
l)− Ti(θ
l) +
τ
n
Πi(θ
l) ≥ θlQi(θ
l−1)− Ti(θ
l−1) +
τ
n
Πi(θ
l−1) . (35)
Moreover, the local incentive constraints (34) and (35) imply that, for all i, Qi(θ
l) ≥ Qi(θ
l−1), for all
l > 1.
Proof We first show that for each i and for each l, Qi(θ
l) ≥ Qi(θ
l−1). This follows from adding (34)
and the (35) constraint for θi = θ
l+1, which is given by
θl+1Qi(θ
l+1)− Ti(θ
l+1) +
τ
n
Πi(θ
l+1) ≥ θl+1Qi(θ
l)− Ti(θ
l) +
τ
n
Πi(θ
l) .
We now show that (34) implies that
θlQi(θ
l)− Ti(θ
l) +
τ
n
Πi(θ
l) ≥ θlQi(θ
l+2)− Ti(θ
l+2) +
τ
n
Πi(θ
l+2) , (36)
To see this, rewrite (34) as
θlQi(θ
l)− Ti(θ
l) +
τ
n
Πi(θ
l) ≥ θl+1Qi(θ
l+1)− Ti(θ
l+1) +
τ
n
Πi(θ
l+1)− (θl+1 − θl)Qi(θ
l+1) ,
Since Qi(θ
l+2) ≥ Qi(θ
l+1) we also have
θlQi(θ
l)− Ti(θ
l) +
τ
n
Πi(θ
l) ≥ θl+1Qi(θ
l+1)− Ti(θ
l+1) +
τ
n
Πi(θ
l+1)− (θl+1 − θl)Qi(θ
l+2) ,
Moreover, condition (34) for θi = θ
l+1 is
θl+1Qi(θ
l+1)− Ti(θ
l+1) +
τ
n
Πi(θ
l+1) ≥ θl+1Qi(θ
l+2)− Ti(θ
l+2) +
τ
n
Πi(θ
l+2) ,
Adding the last two inequalities yields
θlQi(θ
l)− Ti(θ
l) +
τ
n
Πi(θ
l) ≥ θlQi(θ
l+2)− Ti(θ
l+2) +
τ
n
Πi(θ
l+2)
Hence, an individual with preference parameter θl does not benefit from announcing θl+2. Iterating this
argument one more establishes that this individual does neither benefit from announcing θl+3, etc.
The proof that an individual with preference parameter θl does not benefit from announcing θl−j for any
j ≥ 1 is analogous and left to the reader.
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Lemma 11 At a solution to the monopoly problem, all local downward incentive compatibility constraints
are binding, all other incentive compatibility constraints are not binding, and the expected payments of
individual i are given by
E[ti(θ)] = E
[(
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q(θ)
]
+
τ
n
Π . (37)
Proof Step 1. We first consider the “relaxed problem” of maximizing Π subject to the local downward
incentive constraints (35), the binding participation constraints for individuals with θi = θ
0, and the
following monotonicity constraints: for all i, Qi(θ
l) ≥ Qi(θ
l−1), for all l > 1.
If one of the downward incentive constraints was not binding, then the expected payments of some
individual could be increased without violating any one of the constraints of the relaxed problem. Hence,
all of these constraints have to be binding. This implies that, for all i and all l ≥ 1,
Ti(θ
l) =
l∑
k=1
θk(Qi(θ
k)−Qi(θ
k−1)) +
τ
n
(
Πi(θ
l)−Πi(θ
0)
)
+ Ti(θ
0) . (38)
From the fact that participation constraints are binding whenever θi = θ
0, it follows that Ti(θ
0) = Πi(θ
0).
Using that θ0 = 0 and that θl+1 − θl = 1, for all l > 0, equation (38) can be equivalently written as
Ti(θ
l) = θlQi(θ
l)−
l−1∑
k=0
Qi(θ
k) +
τ
n
Πi(θ
l) . (39)
By the law of iterated expectations,
E[ti(θ)] =
m∑
j=0
pjTi(θ
j)
=
m∑
j=0
pjθjQi(θ
j)−
m∑
j=1
pj
j−1∑
k=0
Qi(θ
k) +
τ
n
m∑
j=1
pjΠi(θ
j)
= E[θiq(θ)]−
m∑
j=1
(
1−
j∑
k=0
pj
)
Qi(θ
j) +
τ
n
Π
= E[θiq(θ)]−
m∑
j=1
pj
1−
∑j
k=0 p
j
pj
Qi(θ
j) +
τ
n
Π
= E[θiq(θ)]− E
[(
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q(θ)
]
+
τ
n
Π .
Step 2. To complete the proof, Lemmas 9-10 imply that it suffices to show that the solution to the relaxed
problem satisfies all local upward incentive compatibility constraints, i.e., for all i, and all l,
θlQi(θ
l)− Ti(θ
l) +
τ
n
Πi(θ
l) ≥ θlQi(θ
l+1)− Ti(θ
l+1) +
τ
n
Πi(θ
l+1) .
or, equivalently,
θlQi(θ
l)− Ti(θ
l) +
τ
n
Πi(θ
l) ≥ θl+1Qi(θ
l+1)− Ti(θ
l+1) +
τ
n
Πi(θ
l+1)−Qi(θ
l+1) .
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By equation (39), this inequality can also be written as
l−1∑
k=0
Qi(θ
k) ≥
l∑
k=0
Qi(θ
k)−Qi(θ
l+1) ,
or
Qi(θ
l+1) ≥ Qi(θ
l) .
These monotonicity constraints are satisfied at a solution of the relaxed problem.
Lemma 12 At a solution to the monopoly problem, expected after tax profits are given as
(1− τ)Π = E
[
n∑
i=1
(
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q(θ)− βk(q(θ))
]
,
and the ex ante expected payoff of individual i equals
E
[(
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q(θ)
]
Proof Using Lemma 11 to substitute for E [
∑n
i=1 ti(θ)] in the definition of Π, (see equation (6)) and
collecting terms gives the result for after tax profits. Using 11 to substitute for E [ti(θ)] in
E[θiq(θ)− ti(θ)] +
τ
n
Π
gives the result for individual i’s expected payoff.
B.4.2 Participation Constraints that do not include monopoly profits
We now discuss briefly how the analysis changes if instead of the participation constraints in (30) those
in (31) that do not include profits, need to be satisfied. The analysis of this problem requires only minor
adjustments, relative to the proof of Proposition 7. Adjusting the arguments in the proof of Lemma 9,
implies that
Ti(θ
0) = 0. (40)
This yields the following modifications in Lemma 11. The expected payments of individual i ex interim,
provided that θi 6= θ
0, are now given as
Ti(θ
l) = θlQi(θ
l)−
l−1∑
k=0
Qi(θ
k) +
τ
n
(
Πi(θ
l)−Πi(θ
0)
)
(41)
From the ex ante perspective these expected payments are equal to
E[ti(θ)] = E
[(
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q(θ)
]
+
τ
n
Π− (1− P (θ0))
τ
n
Πi(θ
0) (42)
Substituting these expected payments into the definition of Π implies that
(1− τ)Π = E
[
n∑
i=1
(
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q(θ)− βk(q(θ))
]
− (1− P (θ0))
τ
n
n∑
i=1
Πi(θ
0)
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Now it is easy to verify that the mechanism designer may choose the mechanism such that Π(θ0) is
arbitrarily small and hence E[ti(θ)] is arbitrarily large even if Ti(θ
0) = 0 and all local downward incentive
compatibility constraints are binding.17 Consequently, after tax profits are unbounded and the profit-
maximization problem is no longer well defined.
B.5 A model in which expected profits are included in the participation
constraints
The following proposition clarifies how the analysis in Section 4 would be modified if instead of the ex
interim participation constraints in (3) that do not include monopoly profits the ex interim participation
constraints in (7) are imposed.
Proposition 8 The mechanism that maximizes Π subject to the incentive constraints in (2), and the
interim participation constraints (7) has the following properties.
i) The pattern of binding participation and incentive compatibility constraints and the profit-maximizing
provision rule are as in Proposition 7.
ii) The monopolists expected after tax profits, are for all τ , given as
(1− τ)Π∗ = E
[(
n∑
i=1
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q∗∗Π (θ)− βk(q
∗∗
Π (θ))
]
.
For all τ , individual i’s ex ante expected payoff is given by,
E
[
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
q∗∗Π (θ)
]
.
The proposition establishes a neutrality result. The parameter τ neither has an influence on the op-
timal mechanism nor on the distribution of payoffs between the monopolist and the consumers of the
public good. The reason is that, whatever τ , the mechanism designer will ensure that the lowest type’s
participation constraint is binding, so that
Ti(θ
0) =
τ
n
Π∗
for all i. Consequently, a higher τ , implies that the mechanism designer can rise the expected payment
of individuals with the lowest possible valuation, so that their ex interim expected utility level is equal
to 0. Given that the lowest types have an expected utility level of 0, all higher types can only get the
information rent that is due to their private information on their preferences. Hence, whatever τ , their
expected utility level is equal to E
[
1−P (θi)
p(θi)
q∗∗Π (θ)
]
.
An implication of these observations is that the model with monopoly profits in the participation
constraints yields exactly the same results as the model without monopoly profits in the participation
constraints under the additional assumption that, in the latter model, τ = 0. Hence, without loss of
17Suppose that there are only two individuals, n = 2, and only two possible preference parameters, m = 1. The
monopolist can choose q(θ) = 0, for all θ and still choose the payments t1(θ) and t2(θ) such that he makes an
unbounded profit, even though incentive and participation constraints have to be satisfied.
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generality, we may focus on the model with participation constraints that do not include monopoly
profits.18
B.5.1 Proof of Proposition 8
The proof of Proposition 8 is very similar to the characterization of the profit maximizing mechanism
with ex interim participation constraints in the proof of Proposition 4. In the following, we only sketch
the steps where the arguments from the proof of Proposition ?? require some modification. Adjusting
the arguments in the proof of Lemma 6, implies that
Ti(θ
0) =
τ
n
Π∗. (43)
A straightforward modification of Lemma 7 implies that individual i’s expected payments from the ex
ante perspective are equal to
E[ti(θ)] = E
[(
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q(θ)
]
+
τ
n
Π∗ . (44)
Substituting these expected payments into the definition of Π yields
Π = E
[(
n∑
i=1
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q(θ)− βk(q(θ))
]
+ τΠ∗
After plugging the profit maximizing provision rule q∗∗Π into this formula we obtain, by definition of Π
∗,
Π∗ = E
[(
n∑
i=1
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q∗∗Π (θ)− βk(q
∗∗
Π (θ))
]
+ τΠ∗ ,
or, equivalently,
(1− τ)Π∗ = E
[(
n∑
i=1
θi −
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
)
q∗∗Π (θ)− βk(q
∗∗(θ))
]
Finally, to solve for the the ex ante expected payoff of individual i, rearrange equation (44) to obtain
E[θiq(θ)− ti(θ)] +
τ
n
Π∗ = E
[
1− P (θi)
p(θi)
q(θ)
]
Upon substituting the profit-maximizing provision rule q∗∗Π into this formula we obtain the statement in
the Proposition.
18Proposition 8 can also be proven for the model with ex ante instead of ex interim participation constraints.
The details are left to the reader.
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